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SUMMARY
Patient competence is the subject of the present dissertation, which
reflects its author's quest for criteria of the said concept. The leading
research question in this quest is: how ought patient competence to be
assessed? This main question is divided into sub-questions relating to the
rationale of patient competence, the relevance of patient competence,
legal consequences in competence assessment, criteria for assessing
patient competence, problems in competence assessment, the underlying
norm in competence assessment, preconditions of competence
assessment, the conformity of available criteria with these preconditions,
test-like instruments for assessing competence, the psychological validity
of criteria in the light of everyday decision-making, the role of
emotionality in patient competence, possible support during competence
assessment, and indications for such assessment.
With the exception of the overview, which forms the first chapter (see
below), this dissertation's chapters are papers that have been published
elsewhere, and three of them have one or more co-authors (see the
Preface for bibliographic data).
The second chapter of this dissertation gives a legal-ethical outline of the
research context, treating competence in relation to clinical trials using
patients with severe mental illness as subjects. It enumerates several
(international) legal and ethical documents pertaining to human
experimentation. These documents have in common that they establish
valid consent on behalf of the participant as a necessary condition for
legitimate subjection of the participant to research interventions. One of
the necessary conditions for the validity of consent is the consenting
person's competence. Also, the chapter gives a brief comparison with four
other European countries and a discussion of normative aspects of
competence to consent to participation in research, which aspects relate to
the tension between the goal of protecting vulnerable patients and the
goal of favouring scientific progress. It ends with a sketch of the
decision-making procedure called "experienced consent".
Chapter Three reports on a qualitative empirical research study into
assessment of patient competence in a (psycho-)geriatric care setting.
During this study, health care professionals were observed in the daily
course of their activities and later interviewed about the observed results.
The original aim of the study was to make an inventory of criteria used by
health care professionals in their assessment of patient competence.
254 WELIE  •  CRITERIA FOR ASSESSMENT OF PATIENT COMPETENCE
Unexpectedly, the study revealed that patient competence is not a topic of
discussion at all in the observed practice, although the setting had
expressly been selected so as to increase the chances of encountering
patients with questionable ability to decide for themselves. Apparently,
there is a discrepancy between the pivotal place competence occupies in
theoretical models of decision-making, and the actual attention this
concept receives in daily health care practice. This result has been
confirmed in numerous informal contacts with other health care
professionals and academic researchers.
In the chapter, the significance of these factual research data for the law is
explored. It is argued that these data must not be taken as signalling a
shortcoming in health care practice, but that they can methodically serve
as an occasion to critically re-examine the legal model, notably the
concept of competence (see Chapter 4), available empirical approaches
for assessing competence (see Chapter 5), psychological considerations
on competence assessment (see Chapter 6), and the legal role of the
health care professional with respect to patient competence (see Chapter
7).
In the fourth chapter, the critical examination of the concept of
competence is taken up. After a brief introduction to different approaches
used in relation to patient decision-making competence and to the literal
meaning of the term "competence", an outline of four necessary
conditions for competence assessment is given, starting from a
task-specific definition of the concept. These conditions are (1) that the
kind of task be known, (2) that it be known what constitutes sufficient
fulfilment of the task at hand, (3) that the required abilities and qualities
be known, and (4) that it be ascertainable whether or not the person in
question actually has the required abilities and qualities.
Application of these conditions to the field of health care makes us
substitute health care decision-making for the task at hand in the first
condition. Since health care decision-making may involve vital interests,
such as a persons's life, somatic and mental health, functional ability and
well-being, of a vulnerable group, i.e. patients, this task entails an
important responsibility.
From the second condition, it is immediately clear that competence
assessment includes a normative dimension: a threshold is needed to
distinguish sufficient from insufficient fulfilment. It is suggested that
decision-making fostering beneficial health care tailored to the personal
needs and values of the individual patient ought to comprise the
necessary threshold. The chapter underlines the necessity of patient
involvement in decision-making on the assumption that health related
255SUMMARY
interests are too individual to be expressed in commonly applicable terms
and too personal to be wholly knowable for health care professionals.
As to the third condition, such decision-making requires adequate
judgment of the patient's own health related interests. The qualities and
abilities presupposed for that sort of judgment fall into the following four
elements, implying four cumulative criteria of patient decision-making
competence, namely cognitive content (knowledge of facts and personal
values), manipulation of cognitive content (analysing, reasoning,
prioritising, integrating etc.), freedom of will, and means of expression.
The reader should note that possession of these qualities enables the
patient to decide in favour of beneficial health care, but does not compel
him to do so.
The fourth condition relates to the testability of patient incompetence.
Testability of the abilities and qualities required for patient competence,
provides the assessor of competence with an empirical basis for deviating
from the assumption of competence, as the occasion arises.
The fifth chapter embroiders on this notion of testability by reviewing
some empirical approaches for assessing patient competence or
incompetence. It distinguishes between a negative approach, which
focuses on identifying psychopathologic conditions that impair sound
decision-making, and a positive approach, which attempts to assess
whether a patient actually has the required abilities and qualities. The
chapter shows that none of the reviewed approaches offers a reliable and
valid method for competence assessment. Typical of the negative
approach is that it practically includes the whole range of psychiatry. This
is unsatisfactory, because it unsettles the principle of autonomy with
respect to psychiatric patients. In other words, the negative approach may
be very sensitive; but it lacks specificity. The insufficiency of the positive
approach can be attributed to the fact that the abilities and qualities
measured by the tests in question have limited relevance in the context of
patient competence.
Among other things, the chapter's commentary addresses situational
influences in patient competence and competence assessment, of which a
weighty one is the health care professional herself. After all, she shapes
the decision-making task for the patient and judges whether he is able to
perform it. Patient behaviour associated with incompetence might be
reducible to mental incapacity indeed, but it may just as well be the
consequence of a lack of situational support. Such support is possible
with a view to all four qualities and abilities mentioned in the previous
chapter. In this regard, the assessor of patient competence has the duty of
structuring the situation so as to optimise the chances that the person
under investigation meets the criteria of competence. In other words, the
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assessor should not simply attempt to establish the patient's
incompetence, but rather try to get the person to competently decide
himself.
Sixthly, after the empirical review of Chapter 5, the next chapter embarks
upon a psychological analysis of the concept of patient competence. It
concentrates on two elements that are part of common models for patient
competence, namely conscious motivation of decision-making in the first
place and consistency of information-processing in the second. By means
of some illustrative psychological theory and several research examples,
it is argued that in general, the aforesaid models aim too high: application
of these two elements as standards for competence would easily exceed
the way in which persons usually make decisions, certainly when we are
talking about patients who are not quite their normal selves after they
have been overcome with sudden disease.
An investigation of the potential significance of emotionality as criterion
of competence, leads to the conclusion that a patient's emotions do have
relevance to competence assessment in that they may be indicative of this
patient's interests and values, but also to the conclusion that the emotions'
relevance in the context of patient competence is limited in that they do
not decide the matter just like that. Furthermore, the inherent
impossibility of psychometric tests for measuring patient competence is
demonstrated -at least for those cases which raise the need for tests- by
employing psychometric theory and relating that theory to the rationale of
the concept of competence and the underlying principle of respect for
patient autonomy. At the end, this chapter points to the necessity of
obtaining an explicit normative framework for passing judgments on
patient competence.
In the previous chapters it was noticed that clear, concrete, fair criteria of
patient competence which can be reliably and validly assessed at that, are
lacking. In view of this lack, it is not surprising that health care
professionals only rarely venture upon such an assessment in their daily
practice. The seventh chapter, lastly, inquires into the question whether
any grounds can be found in the law for the health care professional to get
round judging patient competence. It does so by critically re-examining
the role of the health care professional in the legal model.
The result of this is that the health care professional is indeed shown to
have reasons justifiably to steer clear of explicit competence assessment:
generally speaking, the professional may want to appeal to the
assumption of patient competence, when she thinks that there is no
legitimate trigger for calling it into question. The deeper cause of this is
the fact that the health care professional is expected to evaluate to a
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certain extent herself the personal interests of her patient, and to
incorporate this evaluation in her "medical" decision-making concerning
the patient. If under these circumstances the health care professional
succeeds in persuading the patient and any other persons involved (e.g.
family members or other potential representatives) to assent to the
interventions proposed by her, she is permitted to act on the assumption
that the decision is representative for the interests of the patient.
Insofar as the health care professional rightly takes care of judging her
patient's interests -and properly so-, there is no -or, at any rate, less of a-
need for the patient to do this; and insofar as the patient has no task in
judging his interests, it directly follows from the task-specific character of
the concept that competence does not matter in this regard, and hence
does not have to be assessed. And that demonstrates that from a legal
point of view, the health care professional can often refrain from
assessing competence, or even that she has to refrain from such
assessment. Finally, attention is drawn to the question how professionals
could be able to judge their patients' interests, and to the possible use of
the so-called values history in this respect.
The Overview chapter (Chapter 1), preceding the publications
summarised above, explicates the interrelationship between these
publications. In this overview, it is argued that in organising and
implementing patient care, health care professionals should try to create
circumstances under which it is justified to appeal to the assumption of
competence conceived as a presumption of law. The obligation in
question amounts to doing everything possible to take seriously the
subject of the patient and his wishes, experiences, questions and
hesitancies, and to doing their utmost to shape professional care
interventions in such a way that they are adapted to the patient's values,
interests, needs and lifestyle.
The incidence of cases in which an assessment of patient competence is
nevertheless necessary, with transfer of the decisional power to someone
other than the patient as a possible consequence, cannot be totally ruled
out. The exposition in hand proposes that they be limited to those
situations where one or both of two strictly defined legitimate triggers
present themselves. On the premise that a test of competence is about
testing the quality of the decision-making process, the author defends as
criterion for those -ideally- exceptional cases a recognisable reasons
approach, which requires the patient to demonstrate to the assessor of
competence, usually the health care professional in charge of treatment,
that -and why- his choice is accountable in light of his personal values
and perspective on life and death.
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As to its practical implications, the combination of the discussed
legitimate triggers and the recognisable reasons approach, as visualised in
Figures E, C and K, resembles the sliding scale for competence
assessment. However, in comparison with the sliding scale, the model
defended by the author has the triple advantage -firstly- of being more
consistent, in that it does not pretend to be a test of competence when
such a test is actually not the matter, -secondly- of being more protective,
in that it includes an additional professional safeguard in cases where the
sliding scale would make no demands on patient competence worthy of
mention, and -thirdly- of being more instructive, in that it supplies the
assessor with further guidance if a test of competence must indeed take
place.
